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Abstract—Participatory sensing is emerging as an innovative com-
puting paradigm that targets the ubiquity of always-connected mobile
phones and their sensing capabilities. In this context, a multitude of
pioneering applications increasingly carry out pervasive collection and
dissemination of information and environmental data, such as, traffic
conditions, pollution, temperature, etc. Participants collect and report
measurements from their mobile devices and entrust them to the
cloud to be made available to applications and users. Naturally, due
to the personal information associated to the reports (e.g., location,
movements, etc.), a number of privacy concerns need to be taken
into account prior to a large-scale deployment of these applications.
Motivated by the need for privacy protection in Participatory Sensing,
this work presents PEPSI: a Privacy-Enhanced Participatory Sensing
Infrastructure. We explore realistic architectural assumptions and a
minimal set of formal requirements aiming at protecting privacy of both
data producers and consumers. We propose two instantiations that
attain privacy guarantees with provable security at very low additional
computational cost and almost no extra communication overhead.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, a number of cloud-based ser-
vices have emerged as the key component for infor-
mation sharing in online communities. More recently,
technology has taken a turn toward context-aware,
ubiquitously-available information contributed by indi-
viduals from their mobile devices. In particular, partic-
ipatory sensing [5] entails the widespread availability
of always-on, always-connected mobile devices as well
as their sensing capabilities. Participatory sensing allows
cloud-based services to harvest and share dynamic infor-
mation about environmental trends, such as ambient air
quality [38], parking availabilities [33], earthquakes [47],
consumer pricing information in offline market [16], [43],
and so on. In the last few years, participatory sensing
initiatives have multiplied, ranging from research proto-
types [33], [37] to deployed systems [38].
A typical participatory sensing infrastructure involves
the following parties:
• Sensors, installed on smartphones or other wireless-
enabled devices, emit data reports and form the
basis of any participatory sensing infrastructure.
• Sensor Carriers are usually users who carry their
smartphones, but they could also be vehicles, an-
imals or any other mobile entity equipped with a
portable sensing device that has network connectiv-
ity. Hereafter, we denote a sensor and its carrier as
Mobile Node.
• Network Operators manage the network used to
collect and deliver reports, e.g., maintaining a WiFi,
GSM, or 3G network infrastructure.
• Queriers subscribe to specific information collected
in a participatory sensing application (e.g., “temper-
ature readings from all sensors in San Francisco, CA”)
and obtain corresponding data reports.
• Service Providers are cloud-based services that al-
low effective sharing of information between mobile
nodes and queriers. Since mobile nodes and queriers
have no mutual knowledge, service providers are
key to participatory sensing applications. Data is
reported and searched by its “nature” (e.g., pollu-
tion level in Central Park, New York) and service
providers are responsible for data collection and
dissemination to interested queriers.
The research community is currently proposing plat-
forms for application developers [15] and devising inno-
vative business models, based on incentive mechanisms,
for the capitalization on sensed data [40]. Unfortunately,
security and privacy issues in this emerging computing
paradigm have not always been effectively addressed.
One possible reason is that participatory sensing seem-
ingly shares several features with Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs), a relatively more mature research field
where a number of effective means to guarantee security
have been proposed [10]. However, there is a number
of crucial differences between these two areas. First,
as opposed to low-cost, resource-constrained motes in
WSNs, sensors in participatory sensing applications are
high-end mobile devices (e.g., smartphones). They have
considerable computational power and their batteries
can be easily recharged. Also, privacy concerns in WSNs
are usually not so severe as a common assumption is that
the network operator owns and queries all sensors. This
is not the case in most participatory sensing scenarios.
For instance, consider the case of an acoustic pollution
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2monitoring application: in a WSN scenario, the main
stakeholder, e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency,
would set up a network to sense noise and would
regularly query its sensors to collect measurements. The
same application in a participatory sensing infrastruc-
ture, would employ noise sensors embedded in users’
smartphones to collect noise readings and report them
to a cloud provider, which would forward reports to
interested queriers. Clearly, each report entails a signif-
icant amount of private information that reveals, e.g.,
user’s position and activity, thus, raising severe privacy
concerns.
1.1 Motivation & Contributions
In several participatory sensing settings, there is a ten-
sion between privacy protection and user participation.
On the one hand, the success of any application relies
on context-aware information sensed (and voluntarily
shared) by users from their mobile devices. On the other
hand, this sharing often discloses personal information
and presents a fundamental obstacle to large-scale de-
ployment of applications—arguably, users may decide
to opt-out if they feel that their privacy is endangered.
The number and the heterogeneity of entities involved in
participatory sensing prompts a range of new formidable
privacy challenges that must be carefully addressed.
Prior work has proposed a few solutions to protect
privacy of user locations and reports. However, it has
often introduced unrealistic assumptions and failed to
provide provable security. On the contrary, we aim at a
formal treatment of participatory sensing. We investigate
realistic architectural assumptions and a minimal set of
formal requirements intended to protect privacy of both
data producers (i.e., mobile nodes) and data consumers
(i.e., queriers). We present two instantiations that attain
privacy guarantees with provable security, at very low
additional computational cost and almost no extra com-
munication overhead.
1.2 Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
surveys related work and highlights its limitations. Then,
Section 3 presents main building blocks, parties and
operations and the privacy desiderata for a privacy-
enhanced participatory sensing application. Section 4
introduced an instantiation of PEPSI based on Identity-
Based Cryptography, while Section 5 analyzes its privacy
guarantees. Section 6 presents another instantiation of
PEPSI based on Oblivious Pseudo-Random Functions.
Performance of both instantiations are discussed in Sec-
tion 7. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
Participatory sensing has attracted, in recent years,
great interest from the research community. Security
and privacy challenges have been widely discussed in
[45], [29], [11], [12] but none of them has proposed actual
solutions. To the best of our knowledge, AnonySense [13]
(later extended in [46] and [25]) is the only result to
address privacy-related problems, hence, it is most re-
lated to our work. AnonySense leverages Mix Network
techniques [9] and provides k-anonymity [48], while
[25] shows how to modify the original AnonySense, to
achieve l-diversity [32].
Both [13] and [25] guarantee report integrity using
group signatures (i.e., all sensors share the same group
key to sign reports) and provide limited confidentiality,
as reports are encrypted under the public key of a Report
Service, a trusted party responsible for collecting reports
and distributing them to queriers.
There is also additional research work that focuses on
slightly related problems. For instance, [7] argues that
privacy issues can be addressed if each user has access
to a private server (e.g., a virtual machine hosted by a
cloud service) and uses it as a proxy between her sensors
and applications requesting her data. Nevertheless, the
feasibility of the approach in large scale participatory
sensing applications would be severely limited by cost
and availability of per-user proxies.
Authors of [20] show how to protect user anonymity
while computing community statistics on time-series
data. Their approach leverages data perturbation and
can only be used in closed community scenarios, where
an empirical data distribution is known a priori. Data
perturbation is also at the basis of differential privacy [18]
that aims to provide the maximal accuracy of responses
to queries issued to a statistical database, while preserv-
ing the privacy of single records. Similarly, [44] targets
privacy-preserving data aggregation, e.g., computation
of sum, average, or variance. Our research does not
focus, at the moment, on aggregates or statistics of
the reported data, therefore, aggregation or perturbation
techniques are not applicable to our setting.
Other proposals, such as [17] and [21], aim at guaran-
teeing integrity and authenticity of user-generated con-
tents, by employing Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs).
2.1 Limitations of prior work
The goal of our work is to afford provable privacy
guarantees in participatory sensing applications. To this
end, we now discuss in details limitations and open
problems of prior work in the area.
Limited communication infrastructure. Most relevant
work on privacy for participatory sensing (e.g., [13],
[25], [44]) assumes that measurements are reported via
WiFi networks. In particular, [13], [25] use standard
MAC-IP address recycling techniques to guarantee user
unlinkability between reports with respect to WiFi access
points. Despite extensive research on privacy, anonymity,
and unlinkability in WiFi networks [6], assuming WiFi
as the underlying network, poses severe limitations on
the scope of participatory sensing applications. This is
because an ubiquitous presence of open WiFi networks
3is not realistic today nor anticipated in the next future,
while participatory sensing requires always-on, always-
connected devices. Actually, the majority of existing
participatory sensing applications operate from smart-
phones and use cellular networks to upload reports [41],
[38], [33]. Unfortunately, current technology does not
allow to apply WiFi anonymization techniques to cel-
lular networks. In fact, in cellular networks devices are
identified through their International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI), and ID recycling—besides being impos-
sible with current technologies—would lead to denial
of service (e.g., the device would not receive incoming
calls for its original ID). Moreover, the regular usage
of cellular networks (e.g., including incoming/outgoing
phone calls), as well as heartbeat messages exchanged
with the network infrastructure, irremediably reveal de-
vice’s location to the network operator.
No provable privacy. User privacy in previous work
(e.g., [13], [25]) relies on Mix Networks [9], an anonymiz-
ing technique used to de-link submitted reports from
their origin, before they reach applications. In other
words, a Mix Network acts as an anonymizing proxy and
forwards user reports only when the set of received re-
ports satisfies a system-defined criteria. Privacy metrics
such as k-anonymity [48] or l-diversity [32] have been
defined to characterize privacy through Mix Networks.
For example, a Mix Network that provides k-anonymity
“batches” reports so that it is not possible to link a given
report to its sender, among a set of k reports. Clearly,
anonymity is not guaranteed but it rather depends on
the number of reports received and “mixed” by the Mix
Network. Moreover, there could be scenarios where a
relatively long time could pass before the desired level
of anonymity is reached (when “enough” reports have
been collected).
Multiple Semi-Trusted Parties. Trust relations are dif-
ficult to define and set up in scenarios with multiple
parties. Hence, it is advisable to minimize the number of
trusted parties and the degree to which they are trusted.
Available techniques to protect privacy in participatory
sensing often involve many semi-trusted independent
parties, that are always assumed not to collude. Anony-
sense [13], besides Mobile Nodes, Registration Authority,
and WiFi Access Points, also assumes the presence and
the non-collusion of a Task Service (used to distribute
tasks to users), a Report Service (to receive reports from
sensors), and several Mix Network nodes (i.e., a trusted
anonymizing infrastructure). The assumption of multiple
non-colluding parties raises severe concerns regarding
its practicality and feasibility. It appears difficult to de-
ploy all of the parties in a real world setting where en-
tities provide services only in exchange of some benefit.
For instance, it is not clear how to deploy the Task and
the Report services as two separate entities having no
incentive to collude.
3 PRELIMINARIES
Aiming at a cryptographic treatment of privacy in
participatory sensing, we now formalize entities and
protocols involved in a privacy-enhanced participatory
sensing infrastructure. Before, we introduce some cryp-
tographic background.
3.1 Cryptographic Background
We now provide an overview of building blocks used
in our work, namely, Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
and Oblivious Pseudo-Random Functions (OPRF).
3.1.1 Identity Based Encryption
Identity Based (IB) cryptography represents an effec-
tive alternative to traditional public key cryptography, as
it does not rely on Public Key Infrastructure responsible
to bind public key to parties. In an IB cryptographic
scheme, the identities of the parties “are” their public
keys. In other words, any string can serve as a public
key; corresponding private keys are managed and issued
by a trusted authority, referred to as Private Key Gener-
ator (PKG). The latter is only active when issuing new
keys.
We take advantage of IB cryptography to afford effec-
tive communication between mobile nodes and queriers.
In particular, we use the IB Encryption scheme of Meik-
lejohn et al. [34] that was inspired by the IB scheme
by Boneh and Franklin [3]. The former is composed by
four algorithms: Setup is run by a trusted authority
to set up system parameters and a master secret key;
BlindExtract is an interactive protocol between an
user and the authority wherein the user obtains a secret
key for an identity of her choice, while the authority
learns nothing about the identity picked by the user;
IBEnc encrypts a message for a recipient specified by
an arbitrary identity; IBDec allows for decryption of
ciphertext produced for a given identity, given the cor-
responding secret key.
• Setup(1λ). Given a security parameter λ, generate
two groups group G,GT of prime order q with gen-
erator g and an associated symmetric bilinear map
e : G×G→ GT . Message space is set toM = {0, 1}n
for some value n. Pick random x1, x2 ∈ F∗q and set
X1 = g
x1 , X2 = g
x2 . Choose two cryptographic hash
functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ →M. Se-
cret master key is set to msk = (x1, x2), while public
key is set to pk = (q,G,GT , g, e,M, X1, X2, H,H ′).
• BlindExtract(User(pk, id) ↔Auth(msk)). Given
a string id ∈ {0, 1}∗, the user picks a random r ← F∗q
and sends req = H(id) · gr to the authority. The
latter replies with sk′1 = reqx1 , sk′2 = reqx2 . Finally,
the user computes sk1 =
sk′1
Xr1
, sk2 =
sk′2
Xr2
and sets
the secret key for id to skid = (sk1, sk2). Keys
are properly formed if e(sk1, g) = e(H(id), X1) and
e(sk2, g) = e(H(id), X2).
• IBEnc(pk, id,m). Pick random r ← F∗q and com-
pute Z1 = e(H(id), X1)r, Z2 = e(H(id), X2)r. Then,
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Fig. 1: Privacy-Enhanced Participatory Sensing Infras-
tructure: Mobile Nodes (MNs) register to the Registra-
tion Authority (RA) and, subsequently, report sensed
data to a Service Provider (SP), through the Network
Operator (NO). Queriers (Q), after registering to RA,
subscribe to queries offered by the SP and receive corre-
sponding reports.
compute h = H ′(id, gr, Z1, Z2) and output c =
(gr, h⊕m).
• IBDec(pk, skid, c). Parse c = (c1, c2) and skid =
(sk1, sk2). Compute Z1 = e(sk1, c1), Z2 = e(sk2, c1)
and h = (id, c1, Z1, Z2). Output m = h⊕ c.
The above scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure under the
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption. Further it
enjoys selective-failure blindness [23] and one-more in-
distinguishability [34].
3.1.2 Oblivious Pseudo-Random Functions
A pseudo-random function (PRF) family Φ is a collec-
tion of efficiently computable functions such that, fixed
one function in Φ at random, and given the function
outputs for a number of arbitrary inputs, no efficient
algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in telling if the
outputs belong to one function randomly chosen from Φ
or a true random function. A PRF f is a function that
takes two inputs: a variable x and a function index s,
and outputs fs(x).
We then look at two-party computation of PRFs, and
in particular to Oblivious PRFs (OPRFs). An OPRF is a
two-party protocol, between a sender on private input s,
and a receiver on private input x. At the end of the inter-
action, the receiver obtains fs(x) while the sender learns
nothing. OPRFs have been introduced by Freedman, et
al. [19], based on Naor-Reingold PRF [36].
3.2 Infrastructure
We envision a participatory sensing infrastructure, that
we call PEPSI (Privacy-Enhanced Participatory Sensing
Infrastructure) composed by the following entities:
Mobile Nodes (MNs). They are portable computing
devices with sensing capabilities (i.e., equipped with one
or more sensors) and with access to a cellular network.
They are carried by people or attached to mobile entities.
We assume that MNs run on smartphones and that users
voluntarily engage into participatory sensing. We denote
with N a generic mobile node of a participatory sensing
application.
Queriers. Queriers are end-users interested in receiving
sensor reports in a given participatory sensing applica-
tion. A generic querier is denoted with Q.
Network Operator (NO). The Network Operator is
responsible for the communication infrastructure. We
assume that the NO maintains, and provides access to,
a cellular network infrastructure (e.g., GSM or 3G).
Service Providers (SP). As mobile nodes and queriers
might have no mutual knowledge, the Service Provider
acts as an intermediary between them. That is, SP col-
lects mobile nodes reading and forwards them to in-
terested queriers. We envision one or more cloud-based
SPs running participatory sensing applications that offer
different query types. (For example, a national service
provider, or a commercial entity, may run a pollution
monitoring application and define queries to retrieve
reports of pollution levels in different cities). Service
provider’s duties may include listing available sensing
services, micro-payment, data collection, and notification
to queriers.
Registration Authority (RA). The Registration Authority
handles the application setup, as well as the registration
of participating parties. In our solutions, the RA also
contributes to privacy protection, by generating cryp-
tographic public parameters, handling the registration
of MNs, and managing queriers’ subscription. Note that
the Registration Authority is the only additional party
required by PEPSI in comparison with a “regular” (i.e.,
non-private) participatory sensing application.
3.3 Operations
We now describe the common operations performed
within a privacy-preserving participatory sensing appli-
cation and the interactions between the entities intro-
duced above.
Setup. In this phase, the RA generates all public param-
eters and its own secret key.
MN Registration. Users register their sensor-equipped
device to the RA and install participatory sensing soft-
ware. At this time, the Mobile Node may also fetch the
list of data reports types for which it will later provide
reports. We assume a public list of report types may be
available from either the SP or the RA.
Query Registration. Queriers approach the appropriate
RA and request an authorization to query the participa-
tory sensing application, in order to obtain a specific
type of data reports, e.g., “Pollution level in Manhattan,
5NY”. Similar to MN registration, available report types
are public, and the list is hosted, e.g., at the RA or
at a SP. Next, they may subscribe to one or more
(authorized) queries, by submitting a request to a SP
and awaiting for the responses containing the desired
readings. Ideally, only queriers authorized by the RA
should receive the desired reports. Also, no information
about query interests should be revealed to the SP nor
to the RA.
Data Report. Mobile Nodes report to the Service
Provider their readings, using the network access pro-
vided by the Network Operator. Ideally, this operation
should not reveal to the SP, the NO, or unauthorized
queriers any information about reported data, such as
type of reading (e.g., pollution) or quantitative informa-
tion (e.g., 35mg/m3 carbon oxide). Also, the SP and any
querier should not learn the identity of the source MN.
Query Execution. With this operation, the SP matches
incoming data reports with query subscriptions. Ideally,
this should be done blindly, i.e., the SP should learn noth-
ing beyond the occurrence of an (unspecified) match, if
any.
Figure 1 shows our participatory sensing infrastructure.
In the depicted scenario, one may envision that a phone
manufacturer (e.g., Nokia) acts as the RA and embeds
a given type of sensor (e.g., air pollution meter) in one
or more of its phone models, operated by smartphone
users, i.e., MNs. A service provider (such as Google,
Microsoft, Yahoo, or a non-profit/academic organiza-
tion) offers participatory sensing applications (used, for
instance, to report and access pollution data), and acts
as an intermediary between queriers and mobile nodes.
Finally, queriers are users or organizations (e.g., bikers)
interested in obtaining readings (e.g., pollution levels).
Note that—similar to related work—we do not ad-
dress the problem of encouraging mobile phone users
to run participatory sensing applications, nor we focus
on business incentives for phone manufacturers or for
service providers. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to envi-
sion that queriers are willing to pay small fees (or receive
advertisement) in return to obtaining measurements of
interest.
3.4 Privacy Requirements
Before entering the details of our privacy require-
ments, observe that the main purpose of a participatory
sensing application is to allow queriers to obtain MNs
reports. While our main goal is to protect the privacy
of both data producers and consumers, any entity reg-
istered as querier should be able to receive desired
measurements, thus, techniques to identify legitimate
parties before registering them are beyond the scope of
our work.
We now define the privacy requirements of PEPSI. Our
definitions here are concise, whereas, formal adversarial
games can be found in Section 5. In what follow, we
assume honest-but-curious parties, i.e., each party acts
according to the prescribed protocols, however, they
might try to infer as much information as possible from
obtained results.
Soundness. We say that PEPSI is sound if, upon subscrib-
ing to a query, a querier in possession of the appropriate
authorization obtains the desired readings (if any).
Node Privacy. In a privacy-enhanced participatory sens-
ing application, node reports should be only available to
authorized queriers. In particular, even if measurements
are routed through the service provider, the latter should
not learn any information about reported data. We say
that PEPSI is node-private if neither the NO, the SP, nor
any unauthorized querier, learn any information about
the type of reading or the data reported by the MN.
Also, other MNs should not learn any information about
a given node’s reports.
In other words, only queriers in possession of the corre-
sponding authorization obtain MN’s readings.
Query Privacy. Similar to mobile node reports, query
interests provide a considerable amount of personal
information. Our goal is to keep query interests private
w.r.t. all other parities in the system. This includes the
service provider that should deliver reports to queriers
without learning their interests. Further, while we trust
the RA to manage mobile nodes and querier registra-
tions, we would like it to learn as little information as
possible about interests of queriers.
We say that a PEPSI is query-private if neither the RA,
the NO, the SP, nor any mobile node or any other querier,
learn any information about the query subscribed by a
querier.
Anonymity, Report Unlinkability, and Location Pri-
vacy. While a number of proposals attempt to provide
anonymity, report unlinkability, and location privacy in
mobile applications [30], we argue that it is not possible
to guarantee these features with respect to the Network
Operator (NO), thus, we do not consider them in this
manuscript. The NO, in cellular networks, is required to
know identity and location of a mobile node at any time
(e.g., to provide network connectivity). Furthermore,
current proposals (e.g., [2]) to protect location privacy in
Location-Based Services (LBS) cannot be directly applied
to participatory sensing application, as they focus on
public databases (e.g., fast-foods or ATMs locations)
that users query providing “a location” to refine their
search. Whereas, in participatory sensing applications,
both queriers and mobile nodes include location infor-
mation in their queries or data reports.
4 PEPSI INSTANTIATION
We now present our PEPSI instantiation, in accordance
to the architectural design of Figure 1 and that complies
with privacy requirements of Section 3.4.
64.1 High Level Description
In PEPSI, data reports are always labeled using key-
words that identify the nature of the information an-
nounced by MNs. Similarly, queriers subscribe to given
queries by specifying the corresponding keywords. In
the rest of the paper, we use the term identifier, and the
notation ID (or ID∗) to identify the data report/query
type. Examples of such identifiers include: “Temperature
in San Francisco, CA” or “Pollution in Manhattan, NY”.
The list of identifiers – depending on the application
– can be obtained either from the SP or the RA. In
particular, the RA defines which services (i.e., queries)
will be available for MNs to contribute and for users to
query. However, as these identifiers can be public, they
can be downloaded from the SP or any bulletin board.
For ease of presentation, in the rest of the paper, we
assume that query identifiers are available at the RA.
One of the main goals of PEPSI is to hide reports
and queries to unintended parties. Thus, those cannot
be transmitted in-the-clear, but need to be encrypted. In
the rest of this section, we discuss how to achieve, at the
same time, (1) secure encryption of reports and queries,
and (2) efficient and oblivious matching performed at
the Service Provider.
Report/Query Encryption. One naı¨ve possibility is to
let each querier and each mobile node share a unique
pairwise secret key and employ a symmetric-key cipher,
such as AES [14]. This approach requires queriers and
MNs to interact and establish a shared secret. On the
contrary, participatory sensing requires no contact (nor
mutual knowledge) between them: that is, MNs provide
reports obliviously of (any) potential receiver. Similarly,
queries subscribe to measurements without knowing the
identity of MNs producing reports potentially matching
their interests. Even if we allow interaction between
each mobile node and queriers, we would still need
MNs to encrypt reports under each key shared with
queriers (recall that MNs do not know which queriers
are interested in their reports). This would generate
a number of ciphertexts quadratic in the number of
measurements. Alternatively, we could use a public key
encryption scheme and provide MNs with public keys
of queriers. Still, scalability would be an issue as each
report would be encrypted under the public key of each
querier.
Using Identity-based Encryption. PEPSI’s main build-
ing block is Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), specifically,
the construction given by Meiklejohn et al. [34]. The
main advantage in using IBE, as opposed to standard
public-key cryptography, is to enable non-interactivity
in our protocol design. This is crucial in participatory
sensing scenarios, where MNs and queriers have no di-
rect communication nor mutual knowledge. IBE enables
asymmetric encryption using any string (“identity”) as a
public key. Recall that, in IBE, anyone can derive public
keys from some unique information about recipient’s
identity. Private decryption keys are generated by a
third-party, called the Private Key Generator (PKG).
Our idea is to use labels (i.e., keywords) that define
the type of reports as identities in an IBE scheme. For ex-
amples labels “Temperature” and “San Francisco” can be
used to derive a unique public encryption key, associated
to a secret decryption key. Mobile Nodes encrypt sensed
data using report’s labels as the (public) encryption key.
Query registration then consists in obtaining the private
decryption keys corresponding to the labels of interest.
Decryption keys are obtained, upon query registration,
from the Registration Authority – which acts like a PKG.
Efficient matching. Given encryption/decryption of re-
ports, we still need a way for the Service Provider to
match them against queries. To address this problem, we
leverage an efficient tagging mechanisms: Mobile Nodes
tag each report with a cryptographic token that identifies
the nature of the report only to authorized Queriers,
but does not leak any information about the report
itself. Tags are computed using the same keywords used
to derive encryption keys. Similarly, Queriers compute
tags for keywords of interest, using the correspond-
ing decryption keys, and provide them to the Service
Provider at query subscription. Bilinear maps allow us
to derive the same cryptographic tag for both a report
or a subscription, as long as they are based on the same
keywords. Given our tagging mechanism, the Service
Provider is only required to match tags that accom-
pany reports to the ones used by queriers during their
subscription. Any time a match is found, the report is
marked for delivery to the corresponding querier.
PEPSI Overview. PEPSI works as follows. The RA runs
the Setup algorithm to generate public parameters and
secret keys. In order to pose a query, e.g., identified by
ID∗, queriers first need to register to the RA and obtain
the corresponding authorization (Query Authorization).
Then, they subscribe their queries to the SP (Query
Subscription). In PEPSI, both processes reveal nothing
about queriers’ interests. At the same time, before start-
ing reporting data, MNs need to authenticate to the
RA, and obtain: (i) the identifier ID corresponding to
the type of their reports, and (ii) a token that allows
them to announce data (MN Registration). The on-line
part of PEPSI includes two operations: Data Report and
Query Execution. With the former, MNs upload encrypted
reports to the SP. In the latter, the SP blindly matches
received reports with queries and forwards (matching)
reports to interested queriers. Only authorized queriers
obtain query responses, can decrypt data reports, and
retrieve original measurements. Finally, we let the RA
periodically run a Nonce Renewal procedure to evict ma-
licious MNs from the participatory sensing application.1
This procedure is run periodically (e.g., once a week or
once a month) and the new nonce is securely delivered
1. Techniques to identify malicious MNs are beyond the scope of
this work.
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RA(msk = (x1, x2)) Q(ID∗)
r ←R F∗q
µ = H1(ID∗) · gr
µ
oo
µ′1 = µ
x1
µ′2 = µ
x2
µ′1, µ
′
2 //
sk1 = µ′1/X
r
1
sk2 = µ′2/X
r
2
σID∗ = (sk1, sk2)
Query Subscription
SP Q(ID∗, σID∗ = (sk1, sk2))
Z∗1 = e(h, sk1)
Z∗2 = e(h, sk2)
T ∗ = H2(ID∗, h, Z∗1 , Z
∗
2 )
(Q, T ∗)
oo
Store (Q, T ∗) in S Store (T ∗, ID∗, Z∗1 , Z∗2 ) in SQ
Fig. 2: Query Registration in PEPSI. Common inputs are
q,G,GT , g, h, e,M, X1, X2, H1, H2, H3.
to honest MNs, e.g., using broadcast encryption [4].
4.2 Algorithms Specification
We now present the details of our construction. Table 1
defines symbols used throughout the paper. In each
protocol, we assume a secure, authenticated channel
between communicating parties.
Setup. The Registration Authority, given a security
parameter λ, generates two groups G,GT of prime or-
der q with generator g, and a bilinear map e : G ×
G → GT . Next, it picks random x1, x2 ∈ F∗q and sets
X1 = g
x1 , X2 = g
x2 . Also, a nonce z ∈ F∗q is selected
and h is set such that h = gz . The RA also defines
three cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ. Secret
master key is set to msk = (x1, x2), while public key is
set to pk = (q,G,GT , g, h, e,M, X1, X2, H1, H2, H3).
MN Registration. MN Registration is run between a
mobile node N and RA. The former receives pair (ID, z)
where ID identifies the nature of the readings for which
N will provides reports and z is the nonce generated by
RA during setup.
Query Registration. Query Registration is split in (i)
Query Authorization, when a querier is authorized by
the RA to subscribe to a query of interest and (ii) Query
Subscription, when the querier actually subscribes to
receive measurements from the SP. Both protocols are
shown in Figure 2.
Data Report
N (ID, z,D) SP
Z1 = e(H1(ID)z , X1)
Z2 = e(H1(ID)z , X2)
T = H2(ID, h, Z1, Z2)
k = H3(ID, h, Z1, Z2)
CT = Enck(D) (T,CT )
//
Store (T,CT ) in R
Blind Matching
SP
∀ (T,CT ) ∈ R, ∀ (Q, T ∗) ∈ S,
if T = T ∗, mark (T,CT ) for delivery to Q
Notification
SP Q(SQ)
If (T,CT )
marked for Q
(T,CT )
//
Fetch (T ∗, ID∗, Z∗1 , Z
∗
2 ) from SQ
s.t. T = T ∗
k∗ = H3(ID∗, h, Z∗1 , Z
∗
2 )
Output D=Deck∗ (CT )
Fig. 3: PEPSI online operations. Common inputs are
q,G,GT , g, h, e,M, X1, X2, H1, H2, H3.
During Query Authorization, querier Q chooses an
arbitrary query identifier ID∗, hashes it and blinds it
using some value r taken uniformly at random for F∗q .
The result is sent to the RA that uses her master secret
key (x1, x2) to compute µ′1 = (H1(ID∗) · gr)x1 and
µ′2 = (H1(ID
∗) · gr)x2 . Finally, Q receives (µ′1, µ′2) and
removes the binding factor, to obtain σID∗ = (sk1, sk2).
During Query Subscription, querier Q uses σID∗ to
compute a tag T ∗ that defines her interest at the SP.
Both parties then store bookkeeping information on this
transaction in their respective databases.
Data Report. Mobile node N periodically submits data
reports to SP, using the network infrastructure. As shown
in the top box of Figure 3, reporting measurement D
related to query ID, requires the mobile node to upload
a cryptographic tag T and the encrypted measurement
CT . T is computed using pair (ID, z), received by the
mobile node during MN Registration. The latter is also
used (through a different hash function) to derive k, an
encryption key used to encrypt D via a semantically
secure symmetric encryption scheme (e.g., AES).
Query Execution. Query Execution is split between
Blind Matching and Notification. They are shown in the
middle and lower boxes of Figure 3, respectively.
Blind Matching involves only the SP and requires no
cryptographic operations. The SP only needs to check
cryptographic tags received by mobile nodes within data
8RA Registration Authority
Q Querier
SP Service provider
N Mobile Node
(a) Actors
λ Security parameter
q, G, GT , g, e Public parameters
M Message space
H1, H2, H3 Hash functions
x1, x2 Registration Authority’s master secret key
X1, X2 Registration Authority’s public key
ID, ID∗ Query or report identifier
D Report measurement.
(b) Cryptographic Parameters
TABLE 1: Notation in PEPSI.
reports, against those received by queriers during their
subscriptions. Any time there is a match, the data report
is marked for delivery to the subscribed querier.
Notification happens when the querier receives a new
data report (T,CT ) that matches her interest. At this
time, querier Q retrieves from her subscription database
the record (T ∗, ID∗, Z∗1 , Z∗2 ) such that T = T ∗. Hence, Q
computes key k∗ so that CT can be decrypted.
Nonce renewal. We assume a dynamic set of subscribed
MNs where new sensors can register and malicious
ones are evicted. In order to ban misbehaving mobile
nodes, the Registration Authority periodically generates
and distributes a fresh z to sensors and updates the
public key element h = gz . The former can be securely
distributed to honest mobile nodes, e.g., using broadcast
encryption [4].
5 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we formally analyze the privacy prop-
erties of PEPSI. Observe that PEPSI’s intuition lies in the
application of a key-private IBE system—where query
identifiers are used as identities—to protect privacy in
the participatory sensing setting. Therefore, its privacy
requirements rely on the security and the key-privacy of
the underlying IBE system.
As discussed above, we assume secure and authenti-
cated channels so that the system is immune to a wide
range of attacks, e.g, session high-jacking, eavesdrop-
ping, etc. This is a reasonable assumption as mobile
nodes access participatory sensing applications using 3G
networks, thus, communication between other parties
(e.g., between querier and SP) can rely on standard tools
such as, TSL/SSL.
5.1 Soundness
PEPSI is sound if, at the end of Query Execution, querier
Q outputs D, given that:
(1) Q registered query ID∗ to the RA.
(2) ∃ node N such that N reports (ID,D).
(3) ID∗ = ID.
Our PEPSI instantiation is sound, since, for any regis-
tered query (ID∗, σID∗) held by querier Q, and query
identifier ID reported by a node N if: (1) σID∗ =
(sk1, sk2), and (2) ID∗ = ID, we obtain:
T = H2[ID, h, Z1, Z2] =
= H2[ID, g
z, e(H1(ID)
z, X1), e(H1(ID)
z, X2)] =
= H2[ID
∗, h, e(h, sk1), e(h, sk2)] = T ∗
and, similarly, also k = k∗. Therefore, (i) SP correctly
matches Q’s (authorized) subscription T ∗ with the ap-
propriate node report (T,CT ), and (ii) Q can correctly
decrypt CT and recover D. 
5.2 Node Privacy
Informally, PEPSI is node-private if neither the NO, the
SP, nor any unauthorized querier, learn any informa-
tion about the type of reading or the data reported by
the MN. Also, other mobile nodes in the infrastructure
should not learn any information about a given node’s
reports. That is, only queriers in possession of the corre-
sponding authorization obtain MN’s readings.
Formally, privacy of node N , providing measurement
(ID,D), is guaranteed if no information about (ID,D)
is leaked to unauthorized parties.
We distinguish between node privacy w.r.t. the NO
and the SP and w.r.t. unauthorized queriers.
Node Privacy w.r.t. the NO and the SP. Privacy is con-
sidered as the probabilistic advantage that an adversary
A gains from obtaining encrypted reports. We say that
PEPSI is node-private w.r.t. the NO/SP if no polynomially
bounded adversary A can win the following game with
non-negligible probability above 12 . The game is betweenA and a challenger Ch:
1) Ch executes setup operations and computes public
parameters (q,G,GT , g, h, e,M, X1, X2, H1, H2, H3)
and private parameters (msk, z).
2) A, on input public parameters, selects two reports
((ID0,D0), (ID1,D1)) and gives them to Ch.
3) Ch picks a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} and interacts
with A executing the role of the node N , on input
the public parameters and private input (IDb,Db).
4) A outputs b′ and wins if b′ = b.
Assuming that the underlying IBE system is blind and
anonymous (such as the scheme we use from [34]), PEPSI
9is trivially node-private w.r.t. the NO and the SP in the
Random Oracle Model (ROM). Assuming that H2 and
H3 are modeled as a random oracle, if our claim is not
true then there exists a polynomial-bounded adversary
B that breaks the CPA-security of IBE. 
Node Privacy w.r.t. unauthorized queriers. Privacy is
considered as the probabilistic advantage that an ad-
versary A gains from submitting queries to the SP. We
say that PEPSI is node-private w.r.t. unauthorized queriers
if no polynomially bounded adversary A can win the
following game with non-negligible probability above 12 .
The game is between A and a challenger Ch:
1) Ch executes setup operations and computes public
parameters (q,G,GT , g, h, e,M, X1, X2, H1, H2, H3)
and private parameters (msk, z).
2) A, on input the public parameters, adaptively
queries Ch a number n of times on a set of
identifiers L = {ID0, . . . , IDn}. For every IDi, Ch
responds by giving A a signature σi = (ski:1, ski:2).
3) A announces two new identifier strings
(ID∗0 , ID
∗
1) /∈ L and generates a data record
D∗.
4) Ch picks a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} and interacts
with A taking on the role of a mobile node N ,
on input the public parameters and private input
(ID∗b ,D∗).
5) A outputs b′ and wins if b′ = b.
Assuming that the underlying IBE system is blind
and anonymous (such as the scheme we use from [34]),
the resulting PEPSI scheme is trivially node-private w.r.t.
unauthorized queriers, in the random oracle model.
Indeed, to win the above game, A needs to forge sig-
nature on ID∗0 or ID∗1 . Again, if this happens, then there
exists a polynomial-bounded adversary B that breaks the
security of IBE. 
Remark. Observe that the RA could use its secret key,
msk, to “test” an arbitrary ID∗ against a report (T,CT =
ENCk(D)). That is, the RA could learn whether ID∗ =
ID and violate node privacy. However, assuming that
reports (T,CT ) are super-encrypted under SP’s public
key, the RA can access nodes’ reports only if it colludes
with the SP.
5.3 Query Privacy
Informally, PEPSI is query-private if neither the RA,
the NO, the SP, other queriers, nor any mobile node,
learn any information about query interests of a querier
Q. Query privacy with respect the RA follows from a
similar argument in [26], that is, value µ received by
the RA during Query Authorization is a random value
in G1. Query privacy w.r.t. the NO, any mobile node,
and any other querier, is trivially guaranteed as none of
them obtains any cleartext message from Q. Thus, we
focus on privacy against a malicious SP, described as
the probabilistic advantage that SP gains from obtaining
queries.
Formally, PEPSI is query-private if no polynomially
bounded adversary A can win the following game with
probability non-negligibly over 12 . The game is betweenA and a challenger Ch:
1) Ch executes setup operations and computes public
parameters (q,G,GT , g, h, e,M, X1, X2, H1, H2, H3)
and private parameters (msk, z).
2) A, on input public parameters, chooses two strings
ID∗0 , ID
∗
1 .
3) Ch picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and interacts with
A playing the role of the querier on input the public
parameters and private input (ID∗b ).
4) A outputs b′ and wins if b′ = b.
Assuming that the underlying IBE system is blind and
anonymous ([34]) PEPSI is trivially query-private in the
Random Oracle Model (ROM). Assuming that H2 and
H3 are modeled as a random oracle, if our claim is not
true then there exists a polynomial-bounded adversary
B that breaks the CPA-security of IBE. 
5.4 Anonymity, Report Unlinkability and Location
Privacy
We do not guarantee anonymity, report unlinkability
and location privacy with respect to the network opera-
tor, given the intrinsic nature of the underlying cellular
network. As discussed in Section 3.4, such properties are
impossible to provide w.r.t. the NO, since the NO knows
phone’s position at any time.
Nonetheless, it is possible to modify our protocol to
provide report unlinkability and location privacy w.r.t.
all other parties, if we assume that the NO removes
privacy-sensitive metadata from each report (such as
mobile nodes’ identifiers, the cell from which the report
was originated, etc.), before forwarding it to the SP. Note
that this would not need the use of MixNetworks, i.e.,
the NO does not have to delay message forwarding (e.g.,
until “enough” reports to protect privacy are collected)
but forwards “the payload” of each report (i.e., (T,CT ))
as soon as it is received.
5.5 Trust Assumptions and Limitations
Honest-but-curious Model. The security of PEPSI relies
on the assumption that the SP adheres to the honest-but-
curious adversarial model; that is, the server faithfully
follows all protocols, but it may attempt to passively
violate our privacy goals. Observe that prior work on
participatory sensing [13], [25], [17], [21] assumes the
presence of several non-colluding and/or fully-trusted
parties.
Although it is part of future work extending our
cryptographic protocols to support arbitrarily malicious
adversary. If one relaxes the honest-but-curious assump-
tion, then it would become possible for a malicious SP
to, e.g., launch DoS attacks and disrupt the service (e.g.,
retain reports from queriers). It could also collude with
the RA and “unblind” a subscription or a report. Finally,
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a malicious SP might create spurious accounts, obtain
query authorizations for arbitrary identifiers, and match
them against queriers/mobile nodes tags, in order to
break queriers and mobile nodes privacy.
Nonetheless, we argue that assuming an honest-but-
curious SP is realistic in our model, since, in participa-
tory sensing, SPs often capitalize on the services they
provide, thus, they have no incentive to deviate from an
honest-but-curious behavior. Since the SP provides the
most valuable service to large numbers of users, it has
a valuable reputation to maintain and any evidence or
suspicion of misbehavior would result in a significant
loss of trust and exodus of users. Finally, we highlight
that, on a similar note, many state-of-the-art privacy-
enhancing technologies in, e.g., cloud-computing envi-
ronments, also assume the server provider to be honest-
but-curious [8], [39], [28].
Reading trustworthiness and node reputation. In the
current version of PEPSI, queriers do not associate repu-
tation or trust measures to nodes’ readings, e.g., to filter
misbehaving nodes. Although orthogonal to our main
focus, i.e., privacy and confidentiality protection (which
our work is the first to provably guarantee), we readily
acknowledge that we leave this as part of future work.
Nonetheless, as valid subscribers know the identity of a
mobile node providing a reading of interest, we fore-
see no fundamental obstacle in integrating reputation
frameworks to address reliability and trust, e.g, [49], [24].
Finally, observe that, in the semi-honest model, nodes are
assumed not to report false readings.
Repeated Readings. PEPSI allows a querier to query
all readings satisfying certain conditions, e.g., “tem-
perature in San Francisco”. While, in many scenarios,
this flexibility provides a convenient fine-grained access
policy, in others, this may require users to filter out or
average, a relatively large number of reports. However,
observe that average of all measurements can be ob-
tained by using an (additively) homomorphic encryption
scheme: both the node reporting the measurement and
the intended recipient would derive the secret key of
the homomorphic encryption scheme. Reporting node
would also compute the corresponding public key, under
which measurements are encrypted. Therefore, cipher-
texts would be homomorphic and could be aggregated
at the service provider.
6 OPRF-BASED PEPSI
PEPSI leverages IBE to protect the privacy of both
mobile nodes and queriers during data report and query
execution. Nevertheless, pairing-based operations might
be prohibitive for devices with very limited resources
or in application scenarios with high report rates. (Our
performance evaluation is presented in Section 7.)
In this section, we introduce another instantiation of
PEPSI that avoids bilinear map operations. The main
idea is to design a new Query Authorization protocol,
replacing the blind IB signature scheme with OPRF.
PEPSI can use any OPRF protocol, however, in this paper,
we use a blind-RSA signature based OPRF that is secure
under the one-more RSA assumption [1]. In particular,
the OPRF is defined as fd(x) = H ′(H(x)d) where H(·)
and H ′(·) are defined as random oracles and d is the
secret RSA exponent of the signer.
During Query Authorization, the RA acts as the sender
with private input its RSA signing key, while querier Q
acts as the receiver with private input an arbitrary query
identifier ID∗. At the end of the protocol, Q obtains the
RA signature on ID∗, while RA learns nothing. Hence,
the signature is used to compute the cryptographic
tag T ∗ uploaded to the SP during Query Subscription.
Similarly, mobile nodes must receive a signature by the
Registration Authority on arbitrary query identifier ID,
before reporting measurements. This might be achieved
as in the MN Registration protocol of Section 4.2, or it
could leverage a “blind” protocol as for Query Autho-
rization; in the latter case, mobile nodes would keep the
nature of their reports private w.r.t. the RA. In any case,
the signature obtained by the mobile node is used to
compute the cryptographic tag T that is sent along with
each report and the encryption key used to encrypt the
measurement.
Details of OPRF-based PEPSI protocols are provided
below. We partially re-use the notation of Table 1, how-
ever, we denote with d, resp.,(N, e), RA’s master secret
key, resp., public key.
6.1 Protocols Description
Setup. The Registration Authority (RA), on input of
the security parameter λ, generates a so-called safe RSA
modulus N = pq, where p and q are random distinct
λ1-bit primes, (where λ1 is a polynomial function of
λ), such that p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 for distinct
primes p′, q′. Fixed N , the RA picks a random positive
integer e < φ(N) such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1, and later
computes d such that ed = 1 mod φ(N). It also picks a
Full Domain Hash (FDH) function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → ZN
and two additional hash functions H2 : {0, 1}ZN →
{0, 1}λ2 , H3 : {0, 1}ZN → {0, 1}λ3 (where both λ2, λ3 are
polynomial functions of λ). The RA keeps d private and
publishes N, e,H1, H2, H3.
MN Registration. As described before, N might just
receive (ID, σID) from the RA, where ID identifies the
type of reports and σID = H1(ID)d. Alternatively, we
could preserve the privacy of reports w.r.t. the RA,
defining a MN Registration protocol based on OPRF.
The protocol is depicted in the top box of Figure 4 and
is essentially the OPRF protocol based on blind-RSA
signatures where the mobile nodes plays the role of the
receiver. We assume that before the protocol starts, RA
authenticates N . Hence, the latter picks a random value
r ∈ ZN and blinds its query identifier ID; the blinded
hash is sent to RA for signing. The received signature is
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MN Registration
N (ID) RA(d)
r ←R ZN
µ = H1(ID) · re
µ
//
µ′ = µd
µ′
oo
σID = µ
′/r
Query Authorization
RA(d) Q(ID∗)
r ←R ZN
µ = H1(ID∗) · re
µ
oo
µ′ = µd
µ′
//
σID∗ = µ′/r
Query Subscription
SP Q(ID∗, σID∗)
T ∗ = H2(σID∗ )
(Q, T ∗)
oo
Store (Q, T ∗) in S Store (T ∗, σID∗ , ID∗) in SQ
Fig. 4: OPRF-based PEPSI – offline operations. Common
inputs are N, e,H1, H2, H3.
unblinded by N to retrieve σID, a valid signature of ID
under the secret key of the RA.
Query Registration. This protocol is divided in Query
Authorization and Query Subscription, both depicted in
Figure 4.
Query Authorization is once again the OPRF protocol
but this time the querier is playing as the receiver on
her private input ID∗. At the end of the protocol, she
obtains σID∗ , a valid signature of ID∗ under the secret
key of the RA.
During Query subscription, querier Q computes a
cryptographic tag T ∗ from σID∗ and uploads it at SP.
From that moment on, SP forwards to Q all reports that
match her interest.
Data Report. Protocols details are provided in the
upper box of Figure 5. When mobile node N wants to
report measurement D related to query ID, it computes
a cryptographic tag using RσID. The latter is also used
to compute a key of a symmetric encryption scheme.
Finally, the encrypted data report and the cryptographic
tag are uploaded at SP.
Query Execution This protocol is divided in Blind
Matching and Notification, that are depicted in the mid-
dle and bottom boxes of Figure 5, respectively.
Blind Matching only involves the SP and requires no
cryptographic operations. The SP only needs to find
all received reports that match a subscription. A report
(T,CT ) matches a subscription (Q, T ∗) if T = T ∗. In this
case, the report is marked for delivery to Q.
During Notification, SP sends to Q all reports that
match her subscription(s). For each received report
(T,CT ), Q retrieves the tuple (T ∗, σID∗ , ID∗) such that
T = T ∗. Hence, Q uses σID∗ to derive key k∗ and uses
the latter to decrypt ciphertext CT .
6.2 Discussion
The OPRF-based version of PEPSI is trivially sound.
Its security (i.e., node privacy and query privacy) relies
on the security of the underlaying OPRF (namely, blind-
RSA signatures). That is, an adversary that is capable
of breaking the privacy of either a mobile node or a
querier can be used to build another adversary capable
of breaking the security of the OPRF protocol.
While we use blind-RSA signatures as building block,
PEPSI could actually leverage any OPRF. If new (e.g.,
faster) OPRF constructions are available, they could be
seamlessly integrated in PEPSI for better performance.
The IBE-based version of PEPSI separates roles of
mobile nodes and queries. On one side, once a mobile
node registers for arbitrary query ID, it is allowed to
provide reports but cannot subscribe for other mobile
node reports on the same ID. On the other side, queriers
that subscribe for arbitrary query ID∗, cannot provide
reports for the same query. In the OPRF-based version
of PEPSI, the set of queries and mobile nodes for a
particular query is not necessarily disjoint, i.e., once
obtained a signature by the RA for query ID, it is
possible either to provide reports or to subscribe for
measurements related to ID. Nevertheless, participatory
sensing communities are constituted by users that in-
terchangeably provide and retrieve data for the same
phenomena (e.g., bikers that retrieve pollution data for
their next routes and that provide those measurements
while they are biking). Hence, we argue that grouping
of mobile nodes and queriers is a reasonable trade-off to
achieve a considerable performance improvement.
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section provides an analytical and empirical eval-
uation of the cost of cryptographic operations involved
in PEPSI. We focus our evaluation on the overhead
incurred at Mobile Nodes, since their are usually devices
with constrained resources. We do not study the perfor-
mance/scalability of the Service Provider (SP). To this
end, we note that a SP in PEPSI only needs to match tags
(e.g., 160-bit binary strings) reported by Mobile Nodes
against the ones uploaded by Queriers. The Service
Provider is not involved in any cryptographic operations
and we argue that its performance are comparable to the
ones of a SP in a non-private system, where publishers
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PEPSI OPRF-PEPSI
Exp. / Mult. Map / Hash Exp. / Mult. Map / Hash
Node registr. (N ) - / - - / - 1 / 2 - / 1
Data report (N ) 1 / - 2 / 1 - / - - / 2
Query auth. (Q) 1 / 3 - / 1 1 / 2 - / 1
Query subscr. (Q) - / - 2 / 1 - / - - / 1
Notification (Q) - / - - / 1 - / - - / 1
TABLE 2: Computation overhead for mobile nodes and queriers in PEPSI and OPRF-PEPSI. Symmetric encryption
and decryption are not taken into account.
Data Report
N (σID,D) SP
T = H2(σID)
k = H3(σID)
CT = Enck(D) (T,CT )
//
Store (T,CT ) in R
Blind Matching
SP
∀ (T,CT ) ∈ R, ∀ (Q, T ∗) ∈ S,
if T = T ∗, mark (T,CT ) for delivery to Q
Notification
SP Q(SQ)
If (T,CT )
marked for Q
(T,CT )
//
Retrieve (T ∗, σID∗ , ID∗) from SQ
s.t. T = T ∗
k = H3(σID∗ )
Output D=Deck(CT )
Fig. 5: OPRF-based PEPSI - online operations. Common
inputs are N, e,H1, H2, H3.
and subscribers upload measurements and queries in the
clear.
Theoretical Analysis. Table 2 shows the theoretical com-
putation overhead incurred at mobile nodes and queriers
for both PEPSI and OPRF-PEPSI. In PEPSI, the most
involved protocol for a mobile node is data report where
the node performs one modular exp, computes one hash
function and two bilinear map evaluations. Queriers face
the most complex operations during query subscription
when they compute one hash functions and two bilinear
map evaluations. OPRF-PEPSI allows for lower overhead
as operations at mobile nodes or queriers only involve
modular multiplications and short exponentiations, or
hash function evaluations.
Experimental evaluation. We implemented protocol op-
erations executed by MNs on a Nokia N900 (equipped
with a 600 MHz ARM processor and 256 MB RAM) run-
ning libpbc [31] and gmp [22] cryptographic libraries.
For the instantiation based on pairings, we selected
Type-A pairings and 160-bit prime q. Computation over-
head is due to the computation of T , the encryption key
k, and the encrypted report CT . Note that the first two
values can be computed off-line, independently of the
sensed data. Communication overhead is merely due to
the transmission of T , which is the output of a hash
function (e.g., SHA-1), and can be as small as 160-bit.
Indeed, using available symmetric-key cryptosystems
(e.g., AES), the length of CT is almost the same as a
reading D.
Without leveraging off-line pre-computation, we mea-
sured the time to compute and transmit (T,CT ), us-
ing integers as data reports. Over 100 experiments, we
experienced an average time of 93.47ms to compute
(T,CT ) and around 80ms for transmission over the 3G
network. Note that a naı¨ve (non-private) solution would
save in computation (since data would not be encrypted)
but would spend roughly the same transmission time
to send the report. Finally, remark that the SP incurs
no communication nor computational overhead: its task
is limited to forwarding and hash comparisons. Simi-
larly, the only additional operation that queriers perform
during query execution is the symmetric decryption of
received readings, which incurs a negligible overhead.
OPRF-based PEPSI enjoys the same features of the
protocols presented in Section 4 without resorting to ex-
pensive pairing operations. In particular, the most expen-
sive operation is the RSA signature during mobile node
/ querier registration. According to our experiments,
an RSA signature with a 1024-bit takes 8.4ms (average
over 100 experiments) using Chinese Remainder Theo-
rem.2 Other operations include modular multiplications
(0.03ms), hashing and symmetric encryption/decryption
that have negligible overhead.
8 CONCLUSION
The participatory sensing paradigm bears a great po-
tential. However, its success depends on the number of
users willing to report measurements from their mobile
devices. Clearly, a wide-scale user participation is bound
to effective protocols that preserve privacy of both data
producers (i.e., mobile nodes) and data consumers (i.e.,
queriers). In this paper, we have highlighted shortcom-
ings of previous solutions and we embarked toward a
formal treatment of privacy in participatory sensing. To
2. See items 14.71 and 14.75 in [35] for more details on CRT-based
exponentiation.
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this aim, we analyzed which are the privacy features
that can be guaranteed with provable security and in-
troduced two private participatory sensing instantiations
that attain them. Finally, we provided figures of the
incurred overhead at mobile nodes.
PEPSI allows for privacy-preserving information dis-
semination in participatory sensing application. While
assessing the trustworthiness of submitted reports is not
our main focus, we stress that PEPSI can be plugged in
participatory sensing frameworks that employ trusted
hardware [17], [21], [42]. Alternatively, since reports and
subscription are not anonymous PEPSI could be used in
conjunction with reputation systems [27] to apprise user
reputation and evict malicious users.
As often happens, deploying actual solutions based
on our proposal requires addressing additional (poten-
tial) security issues. As part of future work, we plan
to study and analyze, in realistic use cases, trade-offs
between efficiency and utility related to different levels
of keywords’ granularity, which we have left out of the
scope of this paper. Also, our efforts are focusing on
reputation management, data integrity, DoS prevention,
as well as Sybil attacks. Our immediate next step is to
deploy testing applications using the PEPSI infrastruc-
ture, as well as to devise a large-scale evaluation of its
global overhead. Interesting open challenges, calling for
further research in the area, remain in how to provide
location privacy with respect to cellular network op-
erator, addressing potential collusion between different
parties, integrating trust and reputation frameworks,
and supporting more complex queries (e.g., aggregate
and conjunctive queries).
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